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This paper studies a generalization of the consensus value (cf. Ju, Borm and Ruys (2004))
to the class of partition function form games. The concepts and axioms, related to the
consensus value, are extended. This value is characterized as the unique function that
satis¯es e±ciency, complete symmetry, the quasi null player property and additivity. By
means of the transfer property, a second characterization is provided. Moreover, it is
shown that this value satis¯es the individual rationality under a certain condition, and
well balances the trade-o® between coalition e®ects and externality e®ects. By modifying
the stand-alone reduced game, a recursive formula for the value is established. A further
generalization of the consensus value is discussed. Finally, two applications of the consensus
value are given: one is for oligopoly games in partition function form and the other is about
participation incentives in free-rider situations.
JEL classi¯cation codes: C71; C72; D43; D62.
Keywords: partition function form games; coalition structure; Shapley value; consensus
value.1 Introduction
The problem of sharing the joint gains of cooperation is well captured by cooperative game
theory. The Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) has been proven to be the most studied and
widely used single-valued solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utility
(TU games) as it satis¯es some desirable properties. In some sense, the value captures
the expected outcome of a game, and represents a distinct approach to the problems of
complex strategic interactions that game theory seeks to illuminate (Roth (1988)).
However, considering an economy with externalities one can not easily recommend a
division of the joint pro¯ts in the same way as the ¯nal pro¯ts depend on the coalition
structure which has been formed. This feature was ¯rst captured by Thrall and Lucas
(1963) by the concept of partition function form games: a partition function assigns a
value to each pair consisting of a coalition and a coalition structure which includes that
coalition. The advantage of this model is that it takes both internal factors (coalition
itself) and external factors (coalition structure) that may a®ect cooperation outcomes into
account and allows to go deeper into cooperation problems. Thus, it is closer to real life
although more complex to analyse.
Values for such games can be found in Myerson (1977), Bolger (1986), Feldman (1994),
Potter (2000), and Pham Do and Norde (2002). All of them are in some way extensions of
the Shapley value for cooperative TU games in coalitional form. Myerson (1977) derived
an e±cient value which is a natural extension of the Shapley value based on three simple
axioms. Bolger (1989) derived an e±cient value which assigns zero to dummies and assigns
nonnegative values to players in monotone simple games. Potter (2000) added another
axiom, coalitional symmetry, and modi¯ed the regular concept of the dummy player such
that the dummy player can get nonnegative worth. But note that a null player (which
is called zero player in this paper) still gets zero worth by this solution concept. When
jNj = 3, Potter's value coincides with the values introduced by Bolger and Feldman. But
they are di®erent when jNj > 3. The di®erence is due to the fact that Potter de¯ned
the worth of each embedded coalition as the average worth. Pham Do and Norde (2002)
studied another extension of the Shapley value for the class of partition function form
games, which is the average of a collection of marginal vectors.
This paper takes a di®erent perspective and aims to derive a solution concept which
not only satis¯es \reasonable" properties but also has a constructive sharing procedure.
Following a simple and natural way of generalizing the standard solution for 2-person
partition function form games into n-person cases, a new solution concept for partition
function form games is obtained: the consensus value. It is, in fact, a natural extension of
the consensus value for TU games introduced by Ju, Borm and Ruys (2004). This value
1di®ers from all the previous values as it is characterized to be the unique function that
satis¯es e±ciency, complete symmetry, additivity and the quasi null player property. The
¯rst three requirements are relatively weak, especially the property of complete symmetry
is a natural and obvious requirement. Instead of the regular null player property requiring
zero payo® to a null player, this paper introduces the so-called quasi null player property
based on the positive/negative externalities the null player might bene¯t/su®er from.
One may argue that the e±ciency1 postulate and the null player property seem to be
contradictory to each other when considering solution concepts for partition function form
games because a null player, given the positive externalities she might enjoy, can hardly
participate in coalitions where she contributes nothing and will get zero payo®. More
generally, we have no reason to ignore the externality e®ect in partition function form games
while the regular null player property (or dummy property) rules out the considerations
on externalities and completely favors coalitions. That is, from the positive externality
point of view, any null player could obtain nonnegative worth when standing alone, and
analogously, she might get nonpositive worth in the presence of negative externality, which
opens up the possibility to relax the regular null player postulate. In this spirit, the quasi
null player property is introduced and discussed.
By de¯ning the expected stand-alone value, we can determine, in some sense, the max-
imum/minimum that a null player might get in a game due to the postive/negative ex-
ternalities2. In order to balance the tradeo® between those two contrastive opinions, i.e.
emphasizing coalitions or focusing on externalities, we make a fair compromise and take
the average as the value for a null player, resulting in the quasi null player property. At
the same time, introducing the quasi null player property actually a®ects all other players
in the same way such that any player's value is determined by her contributions to coali-
tions and the externalities imposed on her if stand-alone, which is further con¯rmed by the
general formula of the consensus value: it is the average of the Shapley value introduced
by Pham Do and Norde (2002) and the expected stand-alone value.
A novel feature of the consensus value for TU games is its underlying sharing process.
It is shown in this paper that such a process is particularly suitable for the settings of
partition function form games because, given a coalition structure, the standard solution for
2-person partition function form games can be well implemented. Here, given an ordering
of players, we also take a bilateral perspective and consider to allocate the joint surplus
1A more general criticism on the e±ciency postulate can be traced back to Luce and Rai®a (1957); and
more recently, is seen in Maskin (2003).
2More strictly, since the externalities from di®erent coalitions imposed on a player could be both positive
and negative in a game, the expected stand-alone value is just a value focusing on externalities, in contrast
with the value derived from the contributions to coalitional values.
2of an existing coalition of players (i.e., the incumbents) and an entrant, which means that
the unilateral viewpoint like the marginal contribution approach focusing on entrants is
abandoned. By taking the incumbents as one party and the entrant as a second party, the
standard solution for 2-person games can be applied all the way with consensus. That is,
all the joint surpluses are always equally split between the corresponding two parties. Since
no speci¯c ordering is pre-determined, we average over all possible permutations. Hence,
by this rule, not only the concern of all the possible orderings but also what happens in
each ordering are mutually accepted: consensus is obtained.
By means of the transfer property, a second characterization for the consensus value
is provided. Based on a modi¯cation of the stand-alone reduced game introduced by Ju,
Borm and Ruys (2004) and a related recursive formula, the consensus value for partition
function form games is reformulated. Furthermore, by introducing a share parameter on
the splitting of joint surpluses, a generalization of the consensus value is obtained. In par-
ticular, the Shapley value and the expected stand-alone value are the two polar cases of the
generalized consensus value. Accordingly, characterizations for the expected stand-alone
value are obtained. A special case of the partition function form games is that any player's
stand-alone values are the same as that in the complete breakdown situation. Then, the
consensus value is equivalent to that in TU games, which equals to the average of the
Shapley value and the equal surplus solution.
In addition to this section introducing the paper and reviewing the seminal works
brie°y, the remaining part proceeds as follows. In the next section, we brie°y recall the
basic features of partition function form games. In section 3, we address 2-person partition
function form games and take the corresponding solutions as a standardization and de¯ne
the consensus value for partition function form games. Section 4 introduces the unanimity
games for partition function form games. The consensus value is characterized in an
axiomatic way in section 5. It is shown that the consensus value is the average of the
Shapley value for partition function form games and the expected stand-alone value. A
generalization of this solution concept is discussed in section 6. The ¯nal section shows
the applications of the consensus value by providing two illustrative examples: one is
about oligopoly games in partition function form and the other is about the participation
incentives in free-rider situations.
32 Preliminaries
This section recalls some basic de¯nitions and notations related to games in partition
function form.
A partition · of the player set N, a so-called coalition structure, is a set of mutually
disjoint coalitions, · = fS1;S2;:::;Smg, so that their union is N. Let P(N) be the set of all
partitions of N. For any coalition S µ N, the set of all partitions of S is denoted by P(S). A
typical element of P(S) is denoted by ·S. Note that two partitions will be considered equal
if they di®er only by the insertion or deletion of ;. That is, ff1;2g;f3gg = ff1;2g;f3g;;g.
A pair (S;·) that consists of a coalition S and a partition · of N to which S belongs




N £ P(N)jS 2 ·
ª
:
De¯nition 2.1 A mapping
w : E(N) ¡! R
that assigns a real value, w(S;·), to each embedded coalition (S;·) is called a partition
function. The ordered pair (N;w) is called a partition function form game. The set of
partition function form games with player set N is denoted by PGN.
The value w(S;·) represents the payo® of coalition S, given the coalition structure
· forms. For a given partition · = fS1;S2;:::;Smg and a partition function w, let
¹ w(S1;S2;:::;Sm) denote the m-vector (w(Si;·))
m
i=1. It will be convenient to economize
brackets and suppress the commas between elements of the same coalition. Thus, we
will write, for example, w(fijkg;ffijkg;flhgg) as w(ijk;fijk;lhg), and ¹ w(fijkg;flhg) as
¹ w(ijk;lh). For a partition · 2 P(N) and i 2 N, we denote the coalition in · to which
player i belongs by S(·;i).
The typical partition which consists of singleton coalitions only, · = ff1g;f2g;:::;fngg,
is denoted by [N], whereas the partition, which consists of the grand coalition only is
denoted by fNg. For any subset S µ N, let [S] denote the typical partition which consists
of the singleton elements of S, i.e., [S] = ffjgjj 2 Sg
De¯nition 2.2 A solution concept on PGN is a function f, which associates with each
game (N;w) in PGN a vector f(N;w) of individual payo®s in RN, i.e.,
f(N;w) = (fi(N;w))i2N 2 R
N:
43 The consensus value
In order to generalize the consensus value to the class of partition function form games, let
us ¯rst recall the de¯nition of the consensus value for the class of TU games. A cooperative
TU game is a pair (N;v), where N is the ¯nite set of players and v(S) 2 R is the worth of
coalition S µ N, with the convention that v(;) = 0.
Let ¦(N) be the set of all bijections ¾ : f1;2;:::;jNjg ¡! N of N. For a given ¾ 2 ¦(N)
and k 2 f1;2;:::;jNjg we de¯ne S¾
k = f¾(1);¾(2);:::;¾(k)g and S¾













k) ¡ v(f¾(k + 1)g)
¢
if k 2 f1;:::;jNj ¡ 1g
where r(S¾
k) is the standardized remainder for coalition S¾
k: the value left for S¾
k after
allocating surplus to later entrants (earlier leavers) NnS¾
k.
We construct the individual standardized remainder vector s¾(v), which corresponds to
the situation where the players enter the game one by one in the order ¾(1);¾(2);:::;¾(jNj)
(or leave the game one by one in the order ¾(jNj);¾(jNj ¡ 1);:::;¾(1)) and assign each
player ¾(k), besides her individual wealth v(f¾(k)g), half of the net surplus from the
standardized remainder r(S¾
k) obtained by (the cooperation between) her and the group













if k 2 f2;:::;jNjg
r(S¾
1) if k = 1









The idea to de¯ne the consensus value for partition function form games is similar to
the TU case.
Consider an arbitrary 2-person partition function form game with player set N =
f1;2g and partition function w determined by the values: w(1;f1;2g), w(2;f1;2g) and
w(12;f12g). Note that, as mentioned in section 2, here we use shortcut notations, for
example, w(1;f1;2g) is for w(f1g;ff1g;f2gg), and w(12;f12g) is for w(f1;2g;ff1;2gg).
5A reasonable solution is that player 1 gets
w(1;f1;2g) +
w(12;f12g) ¡ w(1;f1;2g) ¡ w(2;f1;2g)
2
and player 2 gets
w(2;f1;2g) +
w(12;f12g) ¡ w(2;f1;2g) ¡ w(1;f1;2g)
2
:
That is, the (net) surplus generated by the cooperation between player 1 and 2,
w(12;f12g) ¡ w(2;f1;2g) ¡ w(1;f1;2g);
is equally shared between the two players. This solution is called the standard solution for
2-person partition function form games.
Now, we consider a generalization of the standard solution for 2-person games into
n-person cases. It follows the following line of reasoning.
Consider a 3-player game (N;w) with player set N = f1;2;3g. Suppose we have the
order (1;2;3): player 1 shows up ¯rst, then player 2, and ¯nally player 3. When player 2
joins 1, we in fact have a 2-person situation where the surplus sharing problem is solved by
the standard solution. Next, player 3 enters the scene, who would like to cooperate with
player 1 and 2. Because coalition f12g has already been formed before she joins, player 3
will actually cooperate with the existing coalition f12g instead of simply cooperating with
1 and 2 individually. If f12g agrees to cooperate with 3 as well, the value of the grand
coalition, w(123;f123g) will be generated. Now, the question is how to share it?
Again, following the standard solution to 2-person games, one can argue that both
parties should get half of the joint surplus
w(123;f123g) ¡ w(12;f12;3g) ¡ w(f3g;f12;3g)
in addition to their stand-alone payo®s. The reason is simple: coalition f12g should
be regarded as one player instead of two players because they have already formed a
cooperating coalition. Internally, 1 and 2 will receive equal shares of the surplus because
this part is obtained extra by the coalition f12g cooperating with coalition f3g.
One can also tell the story in a reverse way, which yields the same outcome in terms
of surplus sharing. Initially, three players cooperate with each other and w(123;f123g)
is obtained. We now consider players leaving the existing coalitions one by one in the
opposite order (3;2;1). So player 3 leaves ¯rst. By the standard solution for 2-person
games, player 3 should get half of the joint surplus/loss plus her stand-alone payo®, i.e.
w(3;f12;3g) +
w(123;f123g) ¡ w(3;f12;3g) ¡ w(12;f12;3g)
2
;
6as 1 and 2 remain as one cooperating coalition f12g. Thus, the value left for coalition f12g,
which we call the standardized remainder (the value left for the corresponding remaining
coalition) for f12g, is
w(12;f12;3g) +
w(123;f123g) ¡ w(12;f12;3g) ¡ w(3;f12;3g)
2








¡ w(1;f1;2;3g) ¡ w(2;f1;2;3g))
2
:
Extending this argument to an n-person case, we then have a general method, which can
be understood as a standardized remainder rule since we take the later entrant (or earlier
leaver) and all her pre-entrants (or post-leavers) as two parties and apply the standard
solution for 2-person games all the way. Furthermore, since no ordering is pre-determined
for a partition function form game, we will average all possible orderings.
To formally de¯ne the consensus value for partition function form games we need some
more notation. For a given ¾ 2 ¦(N) and k 2 f1;2;:::;jNjg, we de¯ne the partition ·¾
k
associated with ¾ and k, by ·¾
k = fS¾
kg [ [NnS¾
k]. So, in ·¾
k the coalition S¾
k has already
formed, whereas all other players still form singleton coalitions.















k) ¡ w(f¾(k + 1)g;·¾
k)
¢
if k 2 f1;:::;jNj ¡ 1g
where r(S¾
k) is the standardized remainder for coalition S¾
k: the value left for S¾
k after allo-
cating surplus to later entrants (earlier leavers) NnS¾
k. Note that for notational simplicity
we still use the same notation, i.e., r(S¾
k), as that for TU games.
We construct the individual standardized remainder vector s¾(w), which corresponds to
the situation where the players enter the game one by one in the order ¾(1);¾(2);:::;¾(jNj)
(or leave the game one by one in the order ¾(jNj);¾(jNj ¡ 1);:::;¾(1)) and assign each
player ¾(k), besides her stand-alone payo® w(f¾(k)g;·¾
k¡1), half of the net surplus from
the standardized remainder r(S¾
















if k 2 f2;:::;jNjg
r(S¾
1) if k = 1
7De¯nition 3.1 The consensus value °(w) of the partition function form game (N;w) is








Hence, the consensus value can be interpreted as the expected individual standardized
remainder that a player can get by participating in coalitions.
Following the process of obtaining the value, a more descriptive name for this solution
concept could be the average serial standardized remainder value for partition function
form games3.
Example 3.2 This game is from Pham Do and Norde (2002). Consider the partition
function form game (N;w) de¯ned by
¹ w(1;2;3) = (0;0;0);
¹ w(12;3) = (2;0); ¹ w(13;2) = (2;1); ¹ w(23;1) = (3;2);
¹ w(123) = (10):
With ¾ : f1;2;3g ¡! N de¯ned by ¾(1) = 2, ¾(2) = 1 and ¾(3) = 3, which is shortly





¾(3)(w)) = w(3;f12;3g) +
1
2





¾(2)(w)) = w(1;f1;2;3g) +
1
2





¾(1)(w)) = r(f2g) = w(2;f1;2;3g)
1
2
(r(f2;1g) ¡ w(2;f1;2;3g) ¡ w(1;f1;2;3g)) = 3:























3In the same spirit, an alternative name for the Shapley value could be the average serial marginal
contribution value.
4The fact that two permutations like (123) and (213) yield the same payo® vector only holds for the
class of all 3-person partition function form games.







whereas the Shapley value of this game (Pham Do






. One can verify that the value introduced by Potter




for this game as when jNj = 3 the value introduced by Potter coincides with Bolger's value
(Potter (2000)). The di®erence between the consensus value and the others stems from the
way to share joint surpluses and the fact that the externalities of players are taken into ac-
count. The Shapley value still focuses on marginal vectors and rules out externality e®ects.
As for Bolger's value, it considers a di®erent collection of marginal vectors. Potter's value
is obtained by considering the sum of an \average worth" of coalitions.
Similar to the stand-alone recursion of the consensus value for TU games (cf. Ju, Borm
and Ruys (2004)), we can reformulate the consensus value for partition function form
games by modifying the stand-alone reduced game and de¯ning a corresponding recursive
formula.
Formally, let f : PGN ¡! RN be a solution concept. For (N;w) 2 PGN and i 2 N,




> > > > <
> > > > :




2 if S = Nnfig
and call w¡i the stand-alone reduced game of (N;w) with respect to player i.
We say that a solution concept f has the stand-alone recursion if and only if for any

























for all i 2 N.
One can readily check that the consensus value is the unique one-point solution concept
on the class of all n-person partition function form games with n ¸ 2 which is standard
for 2-person partition function form games and satis¯es stand-alone recursion.
94 Unanimity games
This section goes over unanimity games for the class of partition function form games
de¯ned by Pham Do and Norde (2002) as a generalization of unanimity games for the class
of TU games. They established a decomposition theorem, which states that every partition
function form game can be written in a unique way as a linear combination of unanimity
games.
First, let us recall the corresponding concepts for TU games.





1; if T µ S
0; otherwise
for all S µ N.
The unanimity games f(N;uT)jT 2 2Nnf;gg forms a basis for the class of all TU games
with player set N. The unique linear expression of a characteristic function v in terms of










We will now extend the various notions for TU games to partition function form games.
Let ¿ = (S;·) and ¿0(S0;·0) be two embedded coalitions of N. We say that ¿0 is a
generalized subset of ¿, denoted by ¿0 v ¿, if the two following conditions hold
(i) S0 µ S;
(ii) for every two players i;j 2 NnS, S0(·0;i) 6= S0(·0;j) if and only if S0(·;i) 6= S0(·;j).
So, an embedded coalition ¿0 = (S0;·0) is a generalized subset of ¿ = (S;·) if S0 µ S
and if · is the partition that results from partition ·0 by merging the players in SnS0 with
S.
Example 4.1 Let N = f1;2;3;4;5;6;7g, and ¿0 = (123;f123;45;6;7g) 2 E(N). Then ¿0
is a generalized subset of ¿ = (1234;f1234;5;6;7g), but ¿0 is not a generalized subset of
¿00 = (1234;f1234;56;7g).
Below we will de¯ne unanimity games for partition function form games.
10De¯nition 4.2 Let ¿0 = (S0;·0) 2 E(N) be an embedded coalition. The unanimity game





1; if ¿0 v ¿
0; otherwise
for every ¿ 2 E(N).
Example 4.3 This example is from Pham Do and Norde (2002). Let N = f1;2;3g. Let
·1 = [N], ·2 = f12;3g, ·3 = f13;2g, ·4 = f23;1g, ·5 = fNg, and let
¿1 = (1;·1); ¿2 = (2;·1); ¿3 = (3;·1);
¿4 = (12;·2); ¿5 = (3;·2); ¿6 = (13;·3); ¿7 = (2;·3); ¿8 = (23;·4); ¿9 = (1;·4);
¿10 = (123;·5):
The following table gives the values of w¿0(¿) for all embedded coalitions ¿0 and ¿.
¿n¿0 ¿1 ¿2 ¿3 ¿4 ¿5 ¿6 ¿7 ¿8 ¿9 ¿10
¿1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
¿2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
¿3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
¿4 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
¿5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
¿6 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
¿7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
¿8 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
¿9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
¿10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Pham Do and Norde (2002) prove, similarly to the case of TU games, that the unanimity
games form a basis for the class of partition function form games.
Lemma 4.4 If (N;w) is a partition function form game, then there exist uniquely deter-





These numbers are given by ¹¿0 =
P
´:´v¿0(¡1)j¿0j¡j´jw(´), where j¿0j denotes the cardinality
of coalition T in an embedded coalition ¿0 = (T;·).
11Proof. It su±ces to show for the ¹¿0, speci¯ed in the lemma, that w =
P
¿02E(N) ¹¿0w¿0.


























Now, let ´ = (S00;·00) be such that ´ v ¿(= S;·), and consider the expression
P
¿0:´v¿0v¿(¡1)j¿0j¡j´j.
Note that for every S0 with S00 µ S0 µ S there is precisely one partition ·0 2 P(N) such



















If ´ = ¿, we clearly have
P
¿0:´v¿0v¿(¡1)j¿0j¡j´j = 1.
If ´ 6= ¿, then S00 $ S. Hence,
P
¿0:´v¿0v¿(¡1)j¿0j¡j´j = (1 ¡ 1)jSnS00j = 0.
Therefore, we conclude that
P
¿02E(N) ¹¿0w¿0(¿) = w(¿) for all ¿ 2 E(N), which ¯nishes
the proof.
The following example shows the linear expansion of a partition function form game
(N;w) with respect to the unanimity games w¿0.
Example 4.5 Consider the partition function form game (N;w) in Example 4.3. Calcu-
lating the numbers ¹¿0, we have ¹¿0
i = 0 for i = 1;2;3;4;6; ¹¿0
j = 1 for j = 5;7;8;9; and
¹¿0








This section characterizes the consensus value for partition function form games in an
axiomatic way.
12De¯nition 5.1 Given a partition function form game (N;w) 2 PGN, we say that two
players i and j are completely symmetric if for all ·Nnfi;jg 2 P(Nnfi;jg) and S 2 ·Nnfi;jg,
w(S[fig;(·Nnfi;jgnS)[ffjgg[fS[figg) = w(S[fjg;(·Nnfi;jgnS)[ffigg[fS[fjgg)
and
w(fig;(·Nnfi;jgnS) [ ffigg [ fS [ fjgg) = w(fjg;(·Nnfi;jgnS) [ ffjgg [ fS [ figg):
De¯nition 5.2 Given a partition function form game (N;w) 2 PGN, we say that player
i is a null player if for all ·Nnfig 2 P(Nnfig) and S 2 ·Nnfig,
w(S;·Nnfig [ ffigg) = w(S [ fig;(·NnfignS) [ fS [ figg):
In addition, for a partition function form game (N;w) 2 PGN and a player i 2 N, we







jSj!(jNj ¡ jSj ¡ 1)!
jNj!






jSj!(jNj ¡ jSj ¡ 2)!
jNj!
w(fjg;[NnfS;ig] [ fS [ figg):
The expected stand-alone value tells us how much a player may obtain in game (N;w)
when we focus on the stand-alone side of the partition function form game5. Since we
rule out the consideration on coalition values, immediately, a reference point could be that
the value of the grand coalition is equally shared among players, i.e.,
w(N;fNg)
jNj . Focusing
on stand-alone situations implies that we take externality as the only determinant. Given
a player i 2 N, she has two choices concerning externalities, either choosing stand-alone
and enjoying the externalities from coalitions consisting of other players or joining some
coalitions generating externalities to the players standing alone. Thus, the second term in
the above expression corresponds to the ¯rst choice and can be understood as player i's
expected gain from the externalities of all possible coalitions without containing i, where
the distribution of coalitions is such that any ordering of the players is equally likely. The
last term, corresponding to the second choice, is player i's expected loss due to joining
coalitions, which is expressed as the other players' gain from the externalities of coalitions
containing i.
One can ¯nd that in the case that any player has identical stand-alone payo®s in a
partition function form game, the expected stand-alone value is comparable to the equal
surplus solution for TU games.
5Or directly in some special situations that people have no information about the values of coalitions
but only know players' stand-alone values and the value of the grand coalition, we then could get such a
sharing rule, which is actually an equal-surplus-solution style value in partition function form games.
13Proposition 5.3 For a game w 2 PGN, if w(fig;S [ [NnfS;ig] [ ffigg) = w(fig;[N])







for all i 2 N.
Proof. By the de¯nition of the expected stand-alone value and since w(fig;S[[NnfS;ig][
ffigg) = w(fig;[N]) for all S µ Nnfig and for all i 2 N, it follows that
X
SµNnfig:S6=;
jSj!(jNj ¡ jSj ¡ 1)!
jNj!










= (jNj ¡ 1)!





= (jNj ¡ 1)!
:::





= (jNj ¡ 1)!:












Hence, what remains is obvious.
Therefore, the equal surplus solution E for TU games is actually a special case of the













for all i 2 N and for all v 2 TUN, where TUN denotes the class of all TU games with
player set N. Here, the second term is the expected gain as being a stand-alone player
while the last term is the expected loss due to joining coalitions.




i2N fi(w) = w(N;fNg) for all w 2 PGN;
² Complete Symmetry: fi(w) = fj(w) for all w 2 PGN, and for all completely sym-
metric players i;j 2 (N;w);





for all w 2 PGN and for any null player i in (N;w);
² Additivity: f(w1 + w2) = f(w1) + f(w2) for all w1;w2 2 PGN, where w1 + w2 is
de¯ned by (w1 + w2)(S;·) = w1(S;·) + w2(S;·) for every (S;·) 2 E(N).
The properties of e±ciency, complete symmetry, and additivity are clear by themselves.
Here, it is necessary to stress the new property: the quasi null player property.
Let us ¯rst discuss the regular null player property that assigns zero payo® to a null
player. Requiring a solution concept for partition function form games satisfying both
e±ciency and null player property seems inappropriate. For instance, a null player i who
may obtain positive payo® due to the positive externality from coalition Nnfig has to
accept zero payo® in the game according to this null player property. Then, it is hard to
imagine that player i could have any incentive to join the grand coalition. As a consequence,
it is di±cult to justify the e±ciency axiom. More generally, the players who may enjoy
extremely high positive externalities from other coalitions will choose stand-alone as those
e®ects are not well re°ected by the solution concepts that adopt marginal contribution
approach. So, the externality has to be taken into consideration.
As we know, the regular null player property favors coalitions while biases against the
outside individuals. In order to give a fair treatment to both sides, we have to balance
the coalition e®ect and the externality e®ect. More speci¯cally, to assign a null player
0 or ei(w) can be viewed as consequences of two contrastive viewpoints. Concerning the
tradeo® between these two extreme opinions6, an impartial decision could be choosing the
average as the gain of a null player, which results in the so-called quasi null player property.
In addition, one can see that in a special case that a null player i is a zero player, i.e.
w(fig;·Nnfig [ ffigg) = 0 for all ·Nnfig 2 P(Nnfig), she could still get positive worth as
long as her expected loss from externalities is less than the average value
w(N;fNg)
jNj . This
observation implies that the quasi null player property also has the °avor of egalitarianism
or collectivism. The justi¯cation is similar to that in Ju, Borm and Ruys (2004).
6Cultural and philosophical factors may a®ect the propensity or choice between the two extreme
opinions.
15It is shown that the consensus value is the unique function that satis¯es these four
properties.
Theorem 5.4 The consensus value satis¯es e±ciency, complete symmetry, the quasi null
player property and additivity.
Proof.
(i) E±ciency: Clearly, by construction, s¾(v) is e±cient for all ¾ 2 ¦(N).
(ii) Complete symmetry: Let i;j be two complete symmetric players in w 2 TUN. Consider
¾ 2 ¦(N), and without loss of generality, ¾(k) = i, ¾(l) = j, where i;j 2 N. Let ¹ ¾ 2 ¦(N)





¾(m) if m 6= k;l
i if m = l
j if m = k
As ¾ 7! ¹ ¾ is bijective, it su±ces to prove that s¾
i (w) = s¹ ¾
j(w).
Case 1: 1 < k < l.
By de¯nition, we know
s
¾



















































k¡1 = S¹ ¾
k¡1, and apparently w(S¾
k¡1;·¾
k¡1) = w(S¹ ¾
k¡1;·¹ ¾
k¡1). It remains to show that
r(S¾
k) = r(S¹ ¾
k).
Clearly, r(S¾
m) = r(S¹ ¾
m) for m ¸ l. By induction, we can show that r(S¾
l¡t) = r(S¹ ¾
l¡t) for











































Here, since ¾(fl ¡ tg) = ¹ ¾(fl ¡ tg) and S¾
l¡tnfig = S¹ ¾
l¡tnfjg, by complete symmetry, we
know w(S¾
l¡t;·¾
l¡t) = w(S¹ ¾
l¡t;·¹ ¾
l¡t).
16Then, it immediately follows that r(S¾











































Case 2: 1 < l < k. The proof is analogous to Case 1.













¹ ¾(1)(w) = r(S
¹ ¾
1):
What remains is identical to Case 1.
Case 4: 1 = l < k. The proof is analogous to Case 3.
(iii) Additivity: It is immediate, by de¯nition, to see that s¾
¾(k)(w1 + w2) = s¾
¾(k)(w1) +
s¾
¾(k)(w2) for all w1;w2 2 PGN and for all i 2 f1;2;:::;jNjg.
(iv) The quasi null player property: By de¯nition, we know for a partition function form










































































































l ) ¡ w(f¾(l + 1)g;·¾
l )) if 1 · k · jNj ¡ 1
Let player i 2 N be a null player in w. Let ¾(k) = i. Then, by de¯nition, this null player's
17individual standardized remainders in ¾, s¾
i (w) = s¾



































































































































































> > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > :
1
2w(fig;·¾















k¡1) if 2 · k · jNj ¡ 1
r(S¾
1) if k = 1
Consider a class P of jNj permutations ¾ 2 ¦(N) such that for ¾;¿ 2 P it holds that for






That is, given an ordering of the players Nnfig, let null player i move from the end to the
































































































jSj!(jNj ¡ jSj ¡ 1)!
jNj!








jSj!(jNj ¡ jSj ¡ 2)!
jNj!





Theorem 5.5 There is a unique solution on PGN satisfying e±ciency, complete symme-
try, the quasi null player property and additivity. This solution is the consensus value.
Proof. From Theorem 5.4, it follows that the consensus value ° satis¯es e±ciency, com-
plete symmetry, the quasi null player property and additivity.
Conversely, suppose a solution concept f satis¯es these four properties. We have to

















Thus, it su±ces to show that for all ¿0 2 E(N) and ¹¿0 2 R we have f(¹¿0w¿0) = °(¹¿0w¿0).
Let ¿0 = (S0;·0) 2 E(N) and ¹¿0 2 R. For any i = 2 S0, let ·0
Nnfig 2 P(Nnfig) and
S 2 ·0
Nnfig. Let ¿ denote the embedded coalition (S;·0
Nnfig [ fig) and ¿00 denote the
embedded coalition (S [ fig;(·0
NnfignfSg) [ fS [ figg). One readily veri¯es ¿0 v ¿ if and
only if ¿0 v ¿00, so ¹¿0w¿0(¿) = ¹¿0w¿0(¿00). Hence, i is a null player of game (N;¹¿0w¿0).
Therefore, by the quasi null player property,
fi(¹¿0w¿0) = °i(¹¿0w¿0) =
1
2
ei(¹¿0w¿0) for all i = 2 S
0: (1)
For any two players i;j 2 S0, i 6= j, let ·Nnfi;jg 2 P(Nnfi;jg) and S 2 ·Nnfi;jg. Denote by ¿
the embedded coalition (S0[fig;(·Nnfi;jgnfSg)[fjg[fS[figg) and by ¿00 the embedded
coalition (S0 [ fjg;(·Nnfi;jgnfSg) [ fig [ fS [ fjgg). One can see that ¿0 is neither a
generalized subset of ¿ nor a generalized subset of ¿00. So, ¹¿0w¿0(¿) = 0 = ¹¿0w¿0(¿00).
Therefore, i and j are symmetric players in (N;¹¿0w¿0). Thus, by symmetry,
fi(¹¿0w¿0) = fj(¹¿0w¿0) for all i;j 2 S
0; (2)
and similarly,
°i(¹¿0w¿0) = °j(¹¿0w¿0) for all i;j 2 S
0: (3)
Therefore, e±ciency and (1)-(3) imply that







for all i 2 S
0:
Recall that the Shapley value for partition function form games de¯ned by Pham Do
and Norde (2002) assigns zero worth to a null player. Obviously, one can see that the quasi
null player property can be reformulated as fi(w) = 1
2©i(w) + 1
2ei(w) for all w 2 PGN
and null player i in w. Here ©(w) is the Shapley value of game w. In fact, interestingly,
introducing this property in°uences all the players in the same way: each player ¯nally
gets an average of her Shapley value and the expected stand-alone value. Formally, we
have the following theorem.
20Theorem 5.6 The consensus value is the average of the Shapley value and the expected








Proof. It is readily shown that fi(w) := 1
2©i(w) + 1
2ei(w) satis¯es the four characterizing
properties: e±ciency, symmetry, the quasi null player property and additivity.
One may notice that a nice feature of the consensus value for partition function form
games lies in the individual rationality.
First, we de¯ne superadditivity of the partition function form games. A partition
function form games (N;w) 2 PGN is called superadditive if it satis¯es that
w(S [ T;fS [ Tg [ ·NnfS[Tg) ¸ w(S;S [ T [ ·NnfS[Tg) + w(T;S [ T [ ·NnfS[Tg)
for all S;T 2 2N and ·NnS[T 2 P(NnfS [ Tg) with S \ T = ;.
Theorem 5.7 If a partition function form game (N;w) 2 PGN is superadditive and with
nonnegative externalities on individual players, i.e. w(fig;·Nnfig) ¸ w(fig;[N]) for all
i 2 N and ·Nnfig 2 P(Nnfig), then the consensus value satis¯es individual rationality,
that is, °i(w) ¸ w(fig;[N]) for all i 2 N.
Proof. By De¯nition 3.1, it is easy to see that in any superadditive game with nonnegative
externalities on individual players, the individual standardized remainder s¾
i (w) is greater
than the stand-alone value w(fig;[N]) for all i 2 N and ¾ 2 ¦(N).
This is a very reasonable property. However, not all solution concepts satisfy it. See
the following example where the game is taken from Cornet (1998).
Example 5.8 Let the game (N;w) be given by N = f1;2;3g and
¹ w(1;2;3) = (0;0;0);
¹ w(12;3) = (0;3); ¹ w(13;2) = (0;3); ¹ w(23;1) = (3;0);
¹ w(123) = (4):
As the game is superadditive and with nonnegative externalities on individual players,
the consensus value satis¯es individual rationality. Indeed, one can check that the consensus
value of this game °(w) = (1
3; 11
6 ; 11
6 ), which coincides with the Shapley value de¯ned by












21We now provide an alternative characterization for the consensus value by means of the
transfer property, which is in the same spirit as that for the Shapley value for the case of
TU games (cf. Feltkamp (1995)).
The transfer property, introduced by Dubey (1975), that in some sense substitutes
for the additivity, is de¯ned as follows. For any two partition function form games
w1;w2 2 PGN, we ¯rst de¯ne the games (w1 _ w2) and (w1 ^ w2) by (w1 _ w2)(S;·) =
maxfw1(S;·);w2(S;·)g and (w1 ^ w2)(S;·) = minfw1(S;·);w2(S;·)g for all S 2 · and
· 2 P(N). Let f : PGN ¡! RN be a solution concept on the class of partition func-
tion form games. Then, f satis¯es the transfer property if f(w1 _ w2) + f(w1 ^ w2) =
f(w1) + f(w2) for all w1;w2 2 PGN.
In order to characterize the consensus value on the class of all partition function form
games, we ¯rst need some lemmata. The zero game in PGN that is de¯ned by w(S;·) = 0
for all (S;·) 2 E(N) is denoted by 0.
Lemma 5.9 Let f be a solution on PGN satisfying the transfer property, with f(0) = 0.










1 if (S0;·0) = (S;·);
0 if (S0;·0) 6= (S;·):
Proof. We prove in three steps that equation (4) holds.
Step 1: For the class of all non-negative games w the proof is by induction on
k(w) := jfSj(S;·) 2 E(N) and w(S;·) > 0gj:
(A game w is non-negative if w(S;·) ¸ 0 for all (S;·) 2 E(N).)
If k(w) = 0, then w = 0, so f(w) = 0 =
P
(S;·)2E(N) f(w(S;·)±(S;·)).
Take k > 0 and suppose equation (4) holds for all non-negative games w with k(w) <
k. For a non-negative game w with k(w) = k, choose an embedded coalition (S0;·0) 2
E(N) such that w(S0;·0) > 0. Then k(w ¡ w(S0;·0)±S0;·0) = k ¡ 1, (w ¡ w(S0;·0)±S0;·0) _
(w(S0;·0)±S0;·0) = w and (w ¡ w(S0;·0)±S0;·0) ^ (w(S0;·0)±S0;·0) = 0. Hence, using the
22induction hypothesis and the transfer property, we obtain



























Step 2: For non-positive games one proves analogously (interchanging the operations ^
and _) that equation (4) holds.
Step 3: For an arbitrary game w, split the game into its non-negative part v _ 0 and its
non-positive part v ^ 0. The transfer property and steps 1 and 2 imply
f(w) = f(w) + f(0)









Hence equation (4) holds for all partition function form games.
Note that the converse is also true: If a solution concept f on PGN satis¯es equation (4)
for all games w 2 PGN, then f satis¯es the transfer property and f(0) = 0.
While Lemma 5.9 shows that a solution concept satisfying the transfer property is
determined by its values on multiples of Dirac games, the next lemma shows that it is also
determined by its values on multiples of unanimity games.
Lemma 5.10 Let N be ¯xed. Suppose for each (S;·) 2 E(N), S 6= ;, and for each
real number ®, a vector f®;(S;·) 2 RN is given, satisfying f0;(S;·) = 0 for all (S;·) 2 E(N),
S 6= ;. Then there exists a unique solution concept on PGN satisfying the transfer property,
such that
f(®w(S;·)) = f®;(S;·) (5)
for all ® 2 R, and for all (S;·) 2 E(N) and S 6= ;, where w(S;·) denotes the unanimity
games.
23Proof. First we prove the uniqueness. Suppose there exists a solution f satisfying equa-
tion (5) and the transfer property. Then f(0) = f(0w(N;fNg)) = f0;(N;fNg) = 0. Hence
according to Lemma (5.9), equation (4) holds, and applying it to the game ®w(S;·), we
obtain




for all ® 2 R, for all (S;·) 2 E(N) and S 6= ;.
For each ¯xed ® this ¯nite system of linear equations (with variable f®;(S;·) and f(®±(S;·)),






for all ® 2 R, for all (S0;·0) 2 E(N) and S0 6= ;.








for any partition function form game w, which implies that f is unique.
This construction of f proves existence as well: given the numbers f®;(S;·) for all ® 2 R
and (S;·) 2 E(N) and S 6= ;, construct a solution f ¯rst on Dirac games, using equa-
tions (7) and then on all partition function form games using equation (4). This solution
f will then satisfy equation (4), hence it satis¯es the transfer property. It also satis¯es
equation (5), so it is the solution concept asked for.
Using this lemma, we now prove
Theorem 5.11 The consensus value is the only one-point solution on the class of partition
function form games that satis¯es e±ciency, symmetry, the quasi null player property and
the transfer property.
Proof. First of all, we claim that a solution concept f : PGN ¡! RN satisfying additivity
on PGN also satis¯es the transfer property on PGN. To prove this, take w1;w2 2 PGN.
Then, using additivity,
f(w1 _ w2) + f(w1 ^ w2) = f(w1 _ w2 + w1 ^ w2)
= f(w1 + w2)
= f(w1) + f(w2):
24Therefore, the consensus value satis¯es the transfer property.
As we know that requiring a solution concept f : PGN ¡! RN to satisfy e±ciency,
symmetry, and the quasi null player property, it easily follows that f is uniquely deter-
mined for (multiples of) unanimity games. Moreover, based on to Lemma 5.10, one can
readily check that a solution f satisfying the transfer property is uniquely determined for
any game in PGN, since the class of unanimity games forms a basis of PGN.
Similarly, we can characterize the Shapley value for partition function form games by
means of this transfer property.
Theorem 5.12 The Shapley value is the only one-point solution on the class of partition
function form games that satis¯es e±ciency, symmetry, the null player property and the
transfer property.
6 A generalization of the consensus value
By relaxing the way of sharing remainders, we get a generalization of the consensus value:
the generalized consensus value.






w(N;fNg) if k = jNj
w(S¾
k;·¾





k) ¡ w(f¾(k + 1)g;·¾
k)
¢
if k 2 f1;:::;jNj ¡ 1g
The generalized remainder is the value left for S¾
k after allocating surplus to later entrants
NnS¾
k according to share parameter µ.
Correspondingly, the individual generalized remainder vector s¾















if k 2 f2;:::;jNjg
rµ(S¾
1) if k = 1
De¯nition 6.1 The generalized consensus value, °µ, µ 2 [0;1], is de¯ned as the average









25Note that the consensus value corresponds to the case µ = 1
2.
As mentioned in Section 4, dependent on the degree to which that the coalition e®ect
or externality e®ect is preferred by a society, the null player property can be generalized.
De¯ning the µ-null player property of a one-point solution concept f : PGN ¡! RN by
fi(w) = (1¡µ)ei(w) for all w 2 PGN and a null player i 2 N for w, we obtain the following
theorem.
Theorem 6.2 For µ 2 [0;1]:
(a) The generalized consensus value °µ is the unique one point solution concept on PGN
that satis¯es e±ciency, complete symmetry, the µ-null player property and additivity.
(b) For any w 2 PGN, it holds that
°µ(w) = µ©(w) + (1 ¡ µ)e(w)
(c) The generalized consensus value °µ is the unique one point solution concept on PGN
that satis¯es e±ciency, complete symmetry, the µ-null player property and the transfer
property.
Proof. Following the same way to prove Theorem 5.4, Theorem 5.5, Theorem 5.6, and
Theorem 5.11, it is easily established.
In particular, for µ = 1, the generalized consensus value is actually the Shapley value;
for µ = 0, the generalized consensus value equals to the expected stand-alone value.
Consequently, we have
Corollary 6.3 (a) The expected stand-alone value is the unique one-point solution con-
cept on PGN that satis¯es e±ciency, complete symmetry, the 0-null player property and
additivity.
(b) The expected stand-alone value is the unique one-point solution concept on PGN
that satis¯es e±ciency, complete symmetry, the 0-null player property and the transfer
property.
The proof is omitted as it is obvious.
The idea of de¯ning the consensus value can also be extended. If taking the size of the
incumbent party S into consideration, we can argue on a basis of a proportional principle
that given an ordering of players the entrant should get 1
jSj+1 of the joint surplus while
the incumbents get a share of
jSj
jSj+1, which results in another solution concept, namely, the
coalition-size-based consensus value for partition function form games.
267 Some applications of the consensus value
7.1 Application to oligopoly games
Along the same line as Pham Do and Norde (2002), this section ¯rst applies the consensus
value to oligopoly games in partition function form.
Let us focus on a linear oligopoly market of a homogeneous good with asymmetric costs,
no ¯xed costs and no capacity constraints. Such an oligopoly is de¯ned by the vector (b;c) 2
R
n+1
+ , where b > 0 is the intercept of the inverse demand function, c = (c1;c2;:::;cn) ¸ 0
is the marginal cost vector. With loss of generality, assume c1 · c2 · ::: · cn. We also





Note that this assumption is equivalent to the requirement of positive market shares at the
equilibrium for all players (Zhao (2001)). For each supply (input) vector x = (x1;x2;:::;xn),
the price is p(x) = b¡
Pn
i=1 xi, whereas player i's cost and pro¯t (payo®) are Ci(xi) = cixi
and








Player i's reaction curve is implicitly de¯ned by the ¯rst order condition:
@¼i(x)
@xi
= p(x) ¡ xi ¡ ci = 0; or xi =





A Cournot-Nash equilibrium is a vector such that each player's action xi is a best
response to the complementary choice x¡i = (x1;:::;xi¡1;xi+1;:::;xn). This equilibrium is
graphically the intersection point of all reaction curves and algebraically the solution of the


















(b ¡ n ¢ ci +
P
j6=i cj)2
(n + 1)2 :
Now suppose that after su±cient communication, some players may agree to cooperate
(for example, players intend to adjust negative externalities which are caused by decreasing
returns to inputs). In such a situation a coalition structure might form, in which, however,
the payo® of coalition S depends on the behavior of the players outside S, and visa versa.
Notice that the payo® for coalition S under one coalition structure is di®erent from that
27under another coalition structure if the number of coalitions is di®erent. Assume that the
marginal cost of coalition S is cS = mini2Sci, that is, the most e±cient technology in a
coalition can be costlessly adopted by all players in that coalition. Moreover, if a coalition
structure · = fS1;S2;:::;Skg is formed, then, in equilibrium each coalition S in · will
choose the total (input) quantity levels to maximize the sum of its members' pro¯ts, given
the total inputs of the other coalitions in ·.
Let xSj =
P
i2Sj xi denote the total input level for a coalition Sj and ¼Sj(x) denote the
pro¯t of coalition Sj under coalition structure ·,








Coalition Sj's reaction curve under coalition structure · is also implicitly de¯ned by
the ¯rst order condition:
@¼Sj(x)
@xSj
= p(x) ¡ xSj ¡ cSj = 0; or xSj =





















(b ¡ k ¢ cSj +
P
i6=j cSi)2
(k + 1)2 :
The oligopoly game in partition function form (N;w) is determined for every (Sj;·) by
w(Sj;·) = ¼Sj(x¤), where x¤ is the equilibrium vector under coalition structure ·.
To get further illustration of how the consensus value can be used we specify the 3-
person oligopoly game in partition function form (N;w). The partition function form game
is given by ¹ w(1;2;3) = (a1;a2;a3), ¹ w(12;3) = (a12;b3), ¹ w(13;2) = (a13;b2), ¹ w(23;1) =
















































Given the ordering of marginal costs, one can easily see that a1 ¸ a2 ¸ a3, and
a12 ¸ a13 = b1 ¸ a23 = b2 ¸ b3.








2a1 ¡ a2 ¡ a3 +










2a2 ¡ a1 ¡ a3 +









(2a3 ¡ a1 ¡ a2 + b3 ¡ a12)
Note that if players have identical costs, then a1 = a2 = a3 and a12 = a13 = a23 =




Consider the following example for further illustration.
Example 7.1 The game (cf. Pham Do and Norde (2002)) in partition function form
(N;w) associated with a linear oligopoly market (b;c), where b = 20, c = (1;3;4), is given
by
¹ w(1;2;3) = (36;16;9);
¹ w(12;3) = (53:78;18:78); ¹ w(13;2) = (49;25); ¹ w(23;1) = (25;49);
¹ w(123) = (90:25):
The consensus value for this game is °(w) = (46:833;24:833;18:583), whereas the Shap-
ley value is ©(w) = (46:70;24:71;18:83).
297.2 Free-rider, sharing rule and participation incentive
Since the partition function form games can well capture externalities, they provide a
suitable framework to analyze the associated issues such as free-rider problem. Below we
will investigate the e®ects of di®erent solution concepts on the participation incentives of
the players who may free-ride in a game.
Consider the following partition function form game (N;w) (we may call it a free-rider
game) de¯ned by ¹ w(1;2;3) = (0;0;0), ¹ w(12;3) = (1;1), ¹ w(13;2) = (1;1), ¹ w(23;1) = (0;0),
¹ w(123) = 1. This game can be interpreted as follows: Three players are considering to set
up a joint project. Each player has two strategies/choices: participate or stand by. The
success of the project depends on the players' participation. Here, obviously, player 2 and
3 are possible free-riders.
Since both player 2 and 3 are prone to standing by, it is very likely that the project
will fail in the end. Thus, everybody becomes a loser due to their \sel¯sh rationality".
Given the di®erent sharing rules, which one is better for increasing the possible free-riders'
incentive to contribute instead of standing idle? We now check the following solution
concepts and compare their in°uences on players' choices.
1 2 3


















Now we ¯rst discuss the e®ect of the Shapley value on free-riders's participation incen-
tive. Given the Shapley value as the solution concept for the above game, we know the
three players will play the following strategic game.
If player 1 chooses participating, the payo® matrix is provided as below. (Here, the
payo®s in each cell are listed in the order of player 1, 2 and 3.)








2 stand by 1
2;1; 1
2 0;0;0
While if player 1 chooses standing by, all of them will get zero payo® no matter what
strategies player 2 and 3 will choose, i.e.
303 participate 3 stand by
2 participate 0;0;0 0;0;0
2 stand by 0;0;0 0;0;0
So, obviously, choosing participating is the dominant strategy for player 1. One can
easily check this game has two pure-strategy Nash equilibria: (1 participates, 2 participates,
3 stands by) and (1 participates, 2 stands by, 3 participates); and another equilibrium which
involves mixed strategies of players 2 and 3: (1 participates, 2 participates with probability
3
8 and stands by with probability 5
8, 3 participates with probability 3
8 and stands by with
probability 5
8). We may call such an equilibrium semi mixed-strategy equilibrium as player
1 still plays pure strategy.
Similarly, one can check the results due to the implementation of the values by Bolger,
Feldman or Potter. The corresponding two pure-strategy equilibria are the same as above,
while the third equilibrium is di®erent: (1 participates, 2 participates with probability 2
5
and stands by with probability 3
5, 3 participates with probability 2
5 and stands by with
probability 3
5).
Now we check the consensus value in this game. Despite the fact that the two pure-
strategy equilibria are the same as above, the semi mixed-strategy equilibrium is di®erent:
(1 participates, 2 participates with probability 3
7 and stands by with probability 4
7, 3
participates with probability 3





8; and the corresponding expected payo® due to the consensus
value is also greater than the others: 1 8
49 > 1 3
25 > 1 5
64.
Therefore, from the semi mixed-strategy equilibrium, we can see that the consensus
value helps to increase the participation incentives of the possible free-riders.
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